haven/apps/auth

Auth (Authentik + Kyverno SSO annotation policy)

Draft manifests only — nothing applied yet. Convention: any Ingress annotated with use-sso-auth: "true" gets the Authentik forward-auth annotations injected by the Kyverno ClusterPolicy (auth/sso-auth-policy.yaml).

Deploy order

1. Authentik (auth/authentik.yaml) — IdP + embedded outpost. Needs a Postgres user/DB on postgresql.haven first (see below), plus secrets from Vaultwarden/ESO.
2. Proxy provider — create in Authentik UI (or via API) once it's up: one provider per app you want header-auth'd, mode "forward_auth (single app)", or a domain-level provider with the embedded outpost.
3. Kyverno (auth/kyverno-helm.yaml) — policy engine.
4. SSO policy (auth/sso-auth-policy.yaml) — expands use-sso-auth: "true" into auth-url / auth-signin / auth-response-headers annotations.
5. Annotate ingresses: kubectl annotate ingress <name> -n <ns> use-sso-auth=true and mirror the change in this repo.

Postgres bootstrap (one-time, on postgresql.haven)

CREATE USER authentik WITH PASSWORD '<from-vaultwarden>';
CREATE DATABASE authentik OWNER authentik;

Notes

• Outpost URL used everywhere is https://auth.haven — add DNS + ingress for the outpost before annotating anything.
• Apps that should consume the injected X-Authentik-* headers (Grafana auth proxy, Paperless remote-user, OpenWebUI trusted headers) need their own env changes; those are app-side, not covered by the policy.
• API/WebSocket-heavy apps (arr stack, qBittorrent) should NOT get the annotation on API paths — either skip the annotation or exclude paths.

Which apps get the annotation (scoping)

Three tiers, applied per ingress — never blanket:

1. OIDC tier (no annotation, wire native OIDC in the app instead): grafana, paperless, affine, openwebui, vaultwarden, beszel, slink. Proper logout, group mapping, zero API breakage.
2. Forward-auth tier (use-sso-auth: "true"): browser-only utilities with no real auth — it-tools, notepad, searxng, homepage, archivebox, stirlingpdf, file-nginx, code-config, havenllo, own apps (chacal, mindforge) if wanted.
3. Hands off (built-in auth is fine, forward-auth breaks clients): sonarr, radarr, prowlarr, qbittorrent, adguard, changedetection, uptimekuma, cloudreve (WebDAV), jellyfin (clients can't do redirects — only the community SSO plugin route exists).

Pre-annotation checklist (per new app)

Forward-auth breakage is loud and immediate if you look in the right places. Before annotating any real hostname:

1. Ask: what talks to this app that isn't a human in a browser? Mobile/desktop apps with own login, API-key consumers, push/webhook receivers, cronjobs curling through the ingress, WebDAV/RSS → any of those = hands off (tier 3) or exclude paths. "Just me in a browser" = safe.
2. Canary first: create a scratch ingress for the same service (<app>-test.haven) with the annotation; leave the original untouched for ~a week. Forgotten integrations keep hitting the original and only break the canary — instant rollback (kubectl annotate ingress <n> -n <ns> use-sso-auth-).
3. Grep the docs (30s): "reverse proxy", "trusted header", "API key", "webhook", "basic auth". A "running behind a reverse proxy" doc section is where landmines are documented.
4. Header-trust hygiene: apps consuming X-Authentik-* must be reachable ONLY through the ingress (no NodePort/exposed port, otherwise LAN clients can forge headers straight to the pod). Keep built-in local login enabled; never set SSO-only mode.

Files

• kyverno-helm.yaml — Kyverno install values
• sso-auth-policy.yaml — ClusterPolicy: use-sso-auth → nginx auth annotations
• authentik.yaml — Authentik server/worker + outpost, Postgres PVC, ingress

Status / when to actually deploy this (decision from 2026-08-28)

NOT deployed — deliberate. Sole user, low login frequency, everything reachable via wg-easy, so SSO solves a problem that doesn't exist. The *.ivanch.me public ingresses were reviewed instead: exposure without usage is pure risk, and the right fix is removing exposure (VPN-only), not adding an IdP.

Pull the trigger only if one of these becomes true:

1. A second person uses the homelab regularly (SSO value scales with users).
2. Something must be exposed that can't sit behind VPN (third-party webhooks/callbacks) — then public tier gets use-sso-auth + 2FA.
3. Login friction on the OIDC apps (grafana/paperless/affine/openwebui/ vaultwarden/beszel/slink) actually annoys on a weekly basis.

Until then this folder is a shelf-ready draft; cost of keeping it is zero.